METAFILES by V-Connect

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Security

How METAFILES protects data at every layer, from the encrypted edge to per-organisation keys, isolation, server-side MSP controls, ransomware protection and WORM.

Security in METAFILES is layered: no single control has to be perfect, because each layer limits what a failure in another can do. This page walks through the layers from the internet down to the disks.

The edge

  • No open web ports. All web traffic reaches the site through an encrypted tunnel; the site opens no inbound web ports to the internet. Certificates are verified end to end.
  • Only known routes. Only the portals' names and the services they need are published. Monitoring, the engine's own interfaces and the certificate authority are never public. The MSP console's address serves only the console's own routes; everything else is refused.
  • Sign-in limits. The MSP console limits sign-in attempts per client and locks an operator account after 10 failures. Portals have their own brute-force protection.
  • Per-organisation rules at the edge. A suspended organisation gets the "suspended" page for every request; a read-only organisation has every change refused before it reaches the portal; and while WORM or a legal hold is on, deletes of trash and versions are refused at the edge too.

Access to the servers

  • Servers are reached only over a private management network, with key-only SSH.
  • The control plane's key is limited to the control plane's own address and to exactly the connections it needs; on the storage servers it allows no forwarding at all.
  • A portal cannot reach the engine's administration ports, and portal ports accept connections only from the app servers.

The control plane and releases

  • The site is built and changed only from a signed release of the deployment kit. The release is built from one exact version of the code, twice, and both builds must be identical before it is signed.
  • Every run first checks the release's signature and every file in it, runs, then checks it again, and leaves a change record.
  • Engine builds are pinned by checksum; a binary that does not match is refused.
  • No proprietary source code is kept on the site's servers.
  • The control plane accepts no inbound connections; changes reach it as signed releases.
  • Secrets are never passed on command lines, in environment variables or in logs, and error messages are scrubbed of secrets before they leave a server.

Encryption

Layer What is encrypted Protects against
The engine, per organisation The content of every file, chunk by chunk, with that organisation's own key, wherever it is stored Someone who gets a copy of the storage or a storage key
Storage disks Every storage disk A disk leaving the site, for example for repair
Storage links Traffic between the storage servers, and from the engine to storage (mutually authenticated TLS) Eavesdropping on the site's network
Edge Every connection from users Eavesdropping on the internet

The site's secrets are kept in a vault that runs on all three storage servers and unseals itself automatically after a restart. An internal certificate authority issues the certificate of every internal service.

Coming: the next generation of the engine also seals each organisation's file metadata (names, sizes and structure), not just file contents, and uses TLS on every internal connection.

Isolation between organisations

Each organisation has its own encryption key, storage space and storage credential, its own database and database user, its own cache space and cache user, its own portal and its own route. An automatic isolation check runs at the end of every organisation build. See Tenant isolation.

MSP controls are enforced on the server

What an MSP sets in the console is not just a label. Each control is enforced at one of these points:

Enforcement point What it enforces
The engine's S3 gateway, which every portal byte passes through Quota, read-only mode, WORM, legal hold and the ransomware trip
Enforcement services on each app server Portal settings: two-factor, sharing, password rules, apps, branding, retention, users and groups, email relay, device approval. They re-apply the MSP's values every few minutes.
The edge The suspended page, read-only mode and guarded deletes
The control plane Building, changing and deleting an organisation's infrastructure

Organisation admins are full administrators of their portal. If they change a setting the MSP enforces, the MSP's value is put back on the next pass, and the change is visible. The gateway-side controls (quota, WORM, legal hold, read-only, suspension, ransomware trip) cannot be changed from the portal at all. See What your MSP controls.

Changes that loosen security or reduce history wait for an undo window, during which any operator can cancel them. Every change is recorded in the organisation's audit trail with the operator's name.

Accounts and passwords

  • MSP operators sign in with named accounts, so every action carries a real name. Passwords are stored only as memory-hard hashes.
  • The console never shows a stored password. Reset & show makes a new one and shows it once.
  • Each organisation can require two-factor sign-in for all users, or only for its admins. Clients then sign in through the browser or with per-device app passwords. See Security and two-factor.
  • Device approval can make every new desktop or mobile client wait for an admin's approval.

Coming: a second sign-in factor for MSP operators with hardware security keys.

Ransomware protection

Every file a portal stores passes through the engine's S3 gateway, so the gateway sees changes from the web, desktop and mobile clients alike. With ransomware protection on, a sudden mass change of files in one organisation trips the gateway: the changes are held in quarantine and the MSP releases them, with a rollback point offered. Versions, the trash and restore points give further ways back.

Organisations created as WORM-capable get their own locked storage. With WORM armed, the engine refuses to delete or overwrite retained data, and the locked storage itself refuses deletes from the engine's own credential. Legal hold stops deletion while it is on. Turning WORM off is a separate, approved step, not a console click, and an organisation that holds retained data cannot be deleted.

Audit

Every action in the console and every event in a portal is written to the organisation's audit trail, where each record is chained to the one before it with a hash. Anyone with access can verify the whole chain live and export it. See Audit.